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Abstract
The attempted coup in Turkey in July 2016 provided a justification for the Turkish 
government to silence oppositional voices in the media and close down many television 
stations. Though the stated aim was to clamp down on the pro-coup Gulenist 
movement, the closure of TV channels has resulted in what I call a ‘communicative 
ethnocide’ silencing Alevi television in particular. Following Yalcinkaya, who builds on 
Clastres concept of ethnocide, I define ‘communicative ethnocide’ as the annihilation 
of the communicative capacity of a particular community by the state with the aim of 
destroying that community’s cultural identity. Although the closure of TV stations was 
not confined to Alevi channels, it has particular implications for the Alevi community 
by destroying its communicative capacity, infrastructure, relations with the viewers, 
and representation regime which are driven by the community’s political ambitions and 
attempts to sustain transnational connections. Parallels are drawn between Alevi and 
Kurdish TV to illustrate the Turkish context.
Keywords
Alevis, communicative ethnocide, ethnic media, Kurds, transnational television, Turkey
Introduction
Turkey was shaken by an attempted coup d’état on 15 July 2016 allegedly orchestrated 
by Gulenists, an Islamist movement which until very recently had been a close ally of 
Turkey’s ruling party the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – Justice and Development 
Party). Afterwards, as of July 2017, more than 50,000 people have been arrested 
including 12 members of parliament; over 111,000 civil servants including more than 
6000 academics have been sacked and banned from public service; and 110 media insti-
tutions have been closed down (http://www.chp.org.tr/Public/0/Folder//66594.pdf, 
accessed 31 July 2017). The coup attempt and the following measures taken by the 
government have also had serious implications for the Turkish media landscape with 
159 journalists arrested and 31 television channels and 34 radio stations closed down 
(http://www.chp.org.tr/Public/0/Folder//66594.pdf). Although the government claims 
that they have supposedly targeted the Gulenist media in particular, the attempted coup 
has provided an excuse for the Turkish government to silence the opposition, including 
Alevis, the Kurdish movement and leftists.
Alevis are the second largest religious group in Turkey with an estimated population 
of 15 to 20 million, but their religion is not recognised by the Turkish state and Alevis 
have a long history of persecution dating back to the 16th century (Sokefeld, 2008; White 
and Jongerden, 2003). More recently the ‘illegitimate’ status of Alevis in Turkey, along 
with economic reasons, has resulted in many leaving Turkey for Western Europe and 
today there is a vibrant Alevi community in Europe with an estimated 400,000 to 600,000 
Alevis in Germany (Massicard, 2010) and 300,000 in the United Kingdom (http://www.
alevinet.org/SAP.aspx?pid = About_en-GB, accessed 15 July 2017). Transnational Alevi 
television has been a significant tool for connecting Alevis living in different countries 
and has been significant in constructing a transnational imagination for them (Emre 
Cetin, 2018). Three Alevi television stations, Cem TV, TV10 and Yol TV were on air 
before the coup attempt of July 2016, but following it, TV10 was closed down in 
September 2016 by decree under the government’s state of emergency and Yol TV’s 
broadcasting was suspended in December 2016 by the Radio and Television Supreme 
Council (RTUK) on the grounds of insulting the President, praising terrorist organisa-
tions and broadcasting without a Turkish licence. Cem TV remains in operation and is 
based in Turkey while TV10 and Yol TV now only use Internet broadcasting mainly from 
Europe. Given that each TV channel represents a different political orientation within the 
Alevi community, the fact that the Turkish government approached each one differently 
is significant in terms of the communicative ethnocide and its nuances that will be dis-
cussed in detail in this article.
By looking at the current Turkish media landscape, and Alevi television in particu-
lar, my aim is to demonstrate that ethnocide as a cultural annihilation also has serious 
consequences in terms of media communication. I argue that the closure of Alevi 
television stations in Turkey is an attempt at the communicative ethnocide of the 
transnational Alevi community by silencing the multiple voices within that commu-
nity, weakening its transnational connections, and damaging the multispatiality 
between the local, national, and transnational that was fundamentally supported by 
Alevi television. I start by providing a theoretical framework on ethnocide by draw-
ing on Appadurai (2006), Clastres (2010) and Yalcinkaya (2014) followed by a dis-
cussion of the context in which the ethnic media operates in Turkey with a particular 
focus on Kurdish and Alevi media. I then introduce the concept of communicative 
ethnocide and discuss its relevance for the contemporary transnational Alevi commu-
nity. The discussion primarily draws on data from interviews with 14 TV channel 
workers such as producers, executives and presenters based in Germany who worked 
for TV stations closed by the Turkish government and which were conducted as part 
of a broader research on Alevi television.
Ethnocide: the cultural annihilation of a community
Genocide is a legal term which refers to the destruction of a community by persecuting its 
members. Although the term is primarily used to address the persecution of the Jewish 
community by the Nazis during World War II, this was not the first act of genocide and 
many communities were intentionally destroyed before this time including the Armenians 
in Turkey during the First World War (Akcam, 2013). Lemkin (cited in Clavero, 2008), 
who coined the term genocide, has suggested that the term ethnocide can also be used as 
a synonym and in legal studies ethnocide often refers to cultural genocide and the cultural 
destruction of indigenous cultures (Clavero, 2008). In the 1970s, it was particularly used 
in relation to indigenous cultures in the Americas (Barabas and Bartholeme, 1973; 
Escobar, 1989; Lizot, 1976; Venkateswar, 2004), although later the concept has been used 
to explain the cultural destruction of different communities living in different countries 
(Casula, 2015; Clarke, 2001; Lemarchand, 1994; Williams, 2002). A report by the United 
Nations on the genocide of indigenous populations refers to ethnocide as follows:
In cases where such [state] measures can be described as acts committed for the deliberate 
purpose of eliminating the culture of a group by systematically destructive and obstructive 
action, they could be deemed to constitute clear cases of ethnocide or cultural genocide. (Cited 
in Clavero, 2008: 99)
Ethnocide can be regarded as a cultural weapon which aims to destroy the culture of 
a community with or without killing its members. While genocide, according to Clastres 
(2010), aims to annihilate the body as the marker of race, ethnocide annihilates the mind; 
it is, he argues, ‘the systematic destruction of ways of living and thinking of people from 
those who lead this venture of destruction’ (p. 103). Although Clastres makes a compari-
son between genocide and ethnocide, he does not equate one with the other, and acknowl-
edges that the destruction of bodies is worse than the destruction of a culture but only on 
the grounds that ‘less barbarity is better than more barbarity’ (p. 103). Williams’ (2002) 
definition of the ‘culture as ordinary’ allows us to reflect on the everyday dimensions of 
ethnocide where we can see how it interrupts, transforms and distorts the everyday prac-
tices of an ethnic community, including its rites and rituals, that provide it with its par-
ticular characteristics. Ethnocide can take different forms such as suggesting the adoption 
of alternative rituals to those specific to the community or forcibly replacing them with 
different practices, or the destruction of culturally significant spaces where everyday 
practices and encounters take place, and so on. Hence, ethnocide can be thought of as a 
programme which attacks the culture of communities on a day-to-day basis.
Essential to both genocide and ethnocide is the concept of the ‘Other’, since in both 
cases the Other means difference and this difference has to be dealt with. For this reason, 
in making sense of ethnocide, it is useful to compare it to genocide’s vision of the Other. 
While the genocidal mind sees the Other as evil and wants to eliminate it, the ethnocidal 
mind wishes to transform it by eliminating the difference and making the Other identical 
to itself. Whereas the genocidal mind sees a hierarchy of races with its own superior to 
others, the ethnocidal mind presupposes a hierarchy of cultures (Clastres, 2010). In this 
sense, ethnocide involves a cultural war against the Other with the aim of diminishing 
the characteristics of what makes the Other different and foreseeing an eventual assimila-
tion of the Other into the mainstream, thus ‘reducing the Other to the same’ by ‘the dis-
solution of the multiple into one’ (Clastres, 2010: 108).
For Clastres (2010), it is a universal fact that all cultures are ethnocentric but being 
ethnocentric does not necessarily entail that a culture is ethnocidal. For this to occur, 
particular tools and opportunities are required and these are afforded through the forma-
tion of the state. For Clastres, the state is a requirement and precondition for ethnocide:
All state organizations are ethnocidal, ethnocide is the normal mode of existence of the State. 
There is thus a certain universality to ethnocide, in that it is the characteristic not only of a 
vague, indeterminate ‘white world’, but of a whole ensemble of societies which are societies 
with a State. (p. 111)
Simply put, the systematic cultural elimination of the Other requires the state’s organ-
ised and institutionalised power. To this can be added the observation by Appadurai (2006) 
that it is not minorities who are violent but rather the state which engages in violence 
because of how the state reacts to them. Minorities according to Appadurai (2006):
[…] create uncertainties about the national self and national citizenship because of their mixed 
status. Their legally ambiguous status puts pressures on constitutions and legal orders. Their 
movements threaten the policing of borders. Their financial transactions blur the lines between 
national economies and between legal and criminal transactions. Their languages exacerbate 
worries about national cultural coherence. Their lifestyles are easy ways to displace widespread 
tensions in society, especially urban society. Their politics tend to be multifocal, so they are 
always sources of anxiety to security states. (pp. 44–45)
For both authors, violence is seen as inherent in the existence of the state and the need 
to engage in systematic violence both leads to and requires the organisational capacity of 
the state. It is important to emphasise this interconnection in order to understand the 
complexity of ethnocide as a cultural form of violence. While Clastres sees ethnocide as 
an inherent characteristic of state societies and considers ethnocide as a tool that can be 
used by every state, he also recognises the potential for resistance by the Other in such 
societies. For Clastres, ‘the ability of resistance of the oppressed minority’ means that 
ethnocide is not an inescapable fate for the Other (p. 103). Whether the Other is able to 
resist ethnocide or not depends on the community’s history and the way that the com-
munity is organised. One needs to look at the community’s capacity as well as the state’s 
approach in a given historical context in order to understand the extent of ethnocide.
According to Yalcinkaya (2014), the Turkish state’s approach towards Alevis must be 
seen as a form of ethnocide even though Alevis themselves have tended to view it rather as 
assimilation. Yalcinkaya (2014: 23) argues that the state’s policies towards Alevis is an 
attempt at getting them to comply with the state’s definition of the ideal citizen, and for this 
reason, ethnocide is a more accurate concept to understand the state’s approach towards 
Alevis. Unlike assimilation which aims at destroying Alevi as an identity along with Alevi 
cultural practices so that culturally Alevis become indistinguishable from the Sunni Muslim 
majority, the Turkish state is concerned with redefining Alevis and their culture to produce 
a political identity commensurate with that of the ideal Turkish citizen. Yalcinkaya adopts 
a Foucauldian approach which sees ethnocide as a creative activity that creates an identity 
while transforming it according to the desires of the state. The state’s ethnocide does not 
aim at destroying Alevis per se, instead it seeks to destroy the community’s internal order 
and its power of self-regulation (Yalcinkaya, 2014: 32) and lying at the core of this ethno-
cidal project is the religious practices of Alevis. The state wants to transform Alevi identity 
through displacing, redesigning and re-conceptualising Alevi rites and rituals (Yalcinkaya, 
2014). The discussion of whether the cemevi, a place where Alevis conduct their religious 
ceremony of the cem, is a place of worship and whether the cem itself is a religious cere-
mony exemplify this approach. The state resists recognising the cemevi and the cem as 
essentially and distinctively religious and instead attempts to redefine them as ‘culturally 
deviant’ practices. Similarly, Alevism is treated as a branch or sect within Islam despite the 
denial of many Alevis that this is the case.1 In this respect, Yalcinkaya (2014) particularly 
focuses on the period in which the AKP government launched various projects involving 
Alevis, such as the Muharrem Fast Breaking, the Alevi Opening, the Alevi Workshops and 
the Mosque-Cemevi project. At the Muharrem Fast Breaking in 2008, Alevi faith leaders, 
dedes, were invited to break their Muharrem fasts according to Islamic conventions and at 
some official meetings such as the Alevi Workshops in 2009 the dedes were treated as 
though they were tariqa leaders, that is leaders of an Islamic school of Sufism (Borovali 
and Boyraz, 2015; Ecevitoglu and Yalcinkaya, 2013; Lord, 2017).
With the fundamental change in the political climate since the 2016 coup attempt, the 
government’s attitudes towards Alevis have hardened and Alevis have been targeted by 
a programme of communicative ethnocide. However, before discussing the nature and 
extent of this communicative ethnocide. it is necessary to discuss the Turkish state’s 
approach towards the ethnic media, and in the next section, I examine not only Alevi 
television but also another ethnic media, Kurdish television, to provide a wider under-
standing of the Turkish context.
The ethnic media in Turkey: Kurdish and Alevi television
Kurdish television
Originally dispersed into four states, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey, the Kurds are currently 
a large community of which there are an estimated 14 million in Turkey and 850,000 in 
Europe (http://www.institutkurde.org/en/kurdorama/, accessed 15 July 2017). While the 
Kurdish movement dates back to the late Ottoman period, the struggle gained consider-
able momentum in 1978 with the formation of the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiye 
Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK)) and their policy of armed opposition to the Turkish state and 
call for independence, later for autonomy and cultural rights. Kurdish television broad-
casting in the Turkish context has been very much framed by this armed conflict and 
political struggle as well as international crises in the region. It makes an interesting case 
study of a medium for an ethnic group which does not have a state yet is aiming to build 
a national identity through television in a transnational context (Hassanpour, 1998, 2003; 
Sinclair and Smets, 2014; Smets, 2016). I shall argue that the experience of Kurdish 
broadcasting in Europe, starting with Med TV and followed by Medya TV and Roj TV, 
illustrates an active form of communicative ethnocide which has strong parallels with the 
fate of Alevi television broadcasting.
Med TV started its broadcasts from the United Kingdom in 1995 with a licence from the 
Independent Television Commission (ITC) granted for 10 years. However, as a result of 
diplomatic pressure from the Turkish state, less than 4 years later in March 1999 its licence 
was revoked by the ITC (Sinclair and Smets, 2014: 324) with accusations that the channel 
supported ‘terrorism’ and broadcast ‘hate propaganda’ (Hassanpour, 1998, 2003). This was 
followed by raids on the studios of Med TV, arrests of the television staff and the seizure of 
its computers and hardware from its offices in Belgium, Germany and the United Kingdom 
after which it began its broadcasts via the French based Eutelsat until France Telecom 
refused to renew its licence (Hassanpour, 1998, 2003). Following a similar pattern to the 
political parties established by the Kurdish movement which were continuously closed 
down and re-opened in different names, Med TV was re-established again as Medya TV in 
France in 1999 from which it broadcast until 2004 when the ‘Conseil Superieur de 
l’Audiovisuel (CSA), the French licensing authority, found that Medya TV was merely a 
successor channel to Med TV and revoked its broadcasting licence’ (Sinclair and Smets, 
2014: 325). Following Medya TV’s closure, Roj TV, which was primarily based in 
Denmark, replaced the channel. Sinclair and Smets (2014) provide a detailed account of 
how Roj TV led to another international crisis, this time between Denmark and Turkey, 
involving various parties such as Eutelsat and Reporters Without Borders in a long judicial 
process. In the event the Danish court ruled against a ban on Roj TV and also Nuce TV, the 
latter having been designed as a replacement in case of Roj TV’s closure. Recently, the 
Kurdish television landscape has expanded to include various local, national and transna-
tional channels as well as thematic broadcasting such as news and children’s television. 
However, the state of emergency has given an opportunity for the Turkish government to 
silence Kurdish media by arresting Kurdish journalists, closing down news agencies and 
blacking out television channels such as Jiyan, Mezopotamya and Denge.
Alevi television
Being a silenced and invisible community, the first explicit presence of Alevis in the 
media was through Alevi radio channels during the unregulated media environment in 
Turkey in the 1990s. The neo-liberal economy of the era, along with the discourses of 
‘being free’ (meaning free from state regulations), allowed various radio stations to 
flourish (Algan, 2003; Kaya and Cakmur, 2010). Alevis had been able to establish their 
presence, raise their voice and reach a broader public than could be achieved through the 
various Alevi magazines that were published at this time. However, due to various rea-
sons, an Alevi presence on television was relatively late and had to wait until the 2000s. 
Until then, the invisibility of Alevi identity in Turkish society had not allowed the devel-
opment of a sustainable financial system to support the Alevi media. Due to the fear of 
persecution in Turkey, Alevis had been unable to organise in large numbers and to repre-
sent themselves through associations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This 
lack of community resources, along with the fear of Alevi individuals such as business 
people who might have held sufficient economic resources to finance media organisa-
tions, held back investment in Alevi media. However, the Sivas Massacre of 1993, where 
35 people who came to Sivas for an Alevi festival were burned to death in a hotel, proved 
to be a turning point for Alevis and was a major boost to the ‘Alevi revival’ which had 
already started in the Alevi community in Europe in the late 1980s (Sokefeld, 2008; 
White and Jongerden, 2003). This can be taken as a turning point for the Alevi media, 
and by the beginning of the new century, it had paved the way for the establishment of 
Alevi television born out of a burning necessity felt by Alevis to become more visible in 
the public sphere and the need for the self-exploration of their identity.
The 2000s can be seen as an experimental period for Alevi business people and organ-
isations who explored the use of satellite broadcasting mostly through European based 
stations. Among the stations that were established were TV Avrupa (based in Germany), 
Dem TV (based in the United Kingdom), Su TV (based in Germany and later in France), 
Duzgun TV and Kanal 12 (both based in Germany), Cem TV (based in Turkey), Yol TV 
(based in Germany and later in Turkey), and TV 10 (based in Germany and in Turkey) 
(Emre Cetin, 2018). Most of these television stations had only a brief existence, largely 
as a result of economic reasons along with the political disagreements among the owners 
that reflected the different political orientations within the Alevi community. More 
recently, there have also been political pressures and under the state of emergency 
declared by the Turkish government after the attempted coup, TV10, which had been on 
air since 2011, was closed in September 2016 and Yol TV, which had been broadcasting 
since 2006, was suspended in late 2016. Both, however, still broadcast on the Internet, 
although with a reduced audience. Currently, only Cem TV, which has been on air since 
2005, remains as an Alevi station broadcasting from Turkey.
What distinguishes these channels from each other is their different interpretations of 
Alevism and their different political orientations, as well as their ownership by different 
organisations and individuals. TV10 is owned by a group of individuals who, in my 
interviews with them, emphasise their commitment to representing the ethnic, religious 
and political differences within the Alevi community. TV10 is also distinguished by its 
close-knit ties with the Kurdish movement and is thereby primarily regarded as the voice 
of Alevi Kurds. On the other hand, Yol TV is run by individuals who act on behalf of the 
European Confederation of Alevi Unions which owns the station. The Confederation 
regards Alevism as separate from Islam and as a faith in its own right. It is interesting to 
note, as we discuss later, that Cem TV, the only station not forced by the Turkish govern-
ment to suspend its broadcasting, fits in most with the Turkish government’s attempts to 
define Alevism within Turkishness. This is most likely explained by the fact that, as I 
have observed previously, ‘Cem TV is run by the Cem Foundation which espouses an 
Islamic understanding of Alevism, regarding it as a sect of Islam within the sufi tradition, 
and also emphasises its Turkish origins’ (Emre Cetin, 2018: 97).
Communicative ethnocide: destroying the communicative 
means of a community
Yalcinkaya (2014: 32–35) describes the particular methods through which ethnocide 
operates. These are displacement of the community, destroying its locality and geography, 
destroying the memory of the community, and the displacement of the community’s per-
formances. I would like to add another to these, destroying the communicative means of 
the community and it is this which I refer to as communicative ethnocide. Being ‘the sup-
pression of cultural differences as deemed inferior or bad’ (Clastres, 2010: 108), ethno-
cidal violence can target the locality, memory, performances and the communicative 
capacity of the community. In other words, communicative ethnocide is not an isolated 
process but is part of the ethnocidal project undertaken on a particular community. Its aim 
is to destroy the communicative means and capacity of that community with the goal of 
interrupting and eventually annihilating its cultural formation. Communicative ethnocide 
can take place through various means and media including cultural events, social gather-
ings, press, television, social media and so on. While each venue through which commu-
nicative ethnocide operates deserves to be investigated in depth, for the purpose of this 
article, I would like to focus on the communicative ethnocide that takes place in the con-
text of television broadcasting.
Communicative ethnocide requires the power of the state because currently states are 
the main actors regulating communication policies through such means as television 
licences, channel allocations and infrastructural regulations. Furthermore, states are the 
primary actors which hold particular agendas and policies concerning minorities. Taken 
together therefore, ethnocide can be seen as a planned and regulated action of the state. 
Communicative ethnocide can take both a passive form, where the state, for example, 
sets up legal barriers to the operation of ethnic media, and an active form, such as impos-
ing a ban on broadcasting in particular languages or interrupting and censoring broad-
casting. In both cases, the aim is to hinder the interaction between the members of the 
community and their ability to stimulate and guide their social imagination as to what 
their community is, and to eliminate the multivocality within the community and inter-
rupt the cultural self-reproduction of the community through media. Therefore, it has 
significant implications in terms of identity politics, minority rights and the way collec-
tive identities that are underrepresented in the media express themselves.
Communicative ethnocide has a number of consequences for ethnic communities in 
four main domains: representation, language, space and civic engagement. For those 
communities that are underrepresented in the mainstream media, the ethnic media pro-
vides opportunities to raise their own voice (Matsaganis et al., 2011), something which 
communicative ethnocide seeks to eliminate by burying communities in order to silence 
them through demolishing the potential for a multivocal media ecology. The ethnic 
media is also crucial for the linguistic survival of many communities as it serves as a 
mean to revive dying languages and popularise them among community members. 
Communicative ethnocide diminishes this opportunity as well as interrupting the transfer 
of native languages to the new generation. It also has serious consequences in terms of 
the spatiality of community identity in an era of satellite broadcasting where members of 
the same community in different localities can connect through television. Especially for 
those minorities that are usually dispersed through different locations or migrant com-
munities, communicative ethnocide means the interruption of self-imagination which is 
constructed through transnational satellite television. Finally, the ethnic media is able to 
engage and mobilise ethnic groups in an active way to become involved in everyday 
politics and right movements as well as community politics (Matsaganis et al., 2011). 
 Communicative ethnocide diminishes this potential for civic engagement by destroying 
the community’s own public sphere.
The contemporary situation of Alevi television exemplifies these features of commu-
nicative ethnocide where Alevi culture is being silenced in the media as a direct policy of 
the Turkish state. Drawing on interviews conducted with producers and managers of 
TV10 and Yol TV, I look at how the communicative ethnocide of Alevi television and its 
effects can be analysed in terms of four different dimensions: infrastructural, audience, 
transnational and resistance. For ethical concerns and given the current political climate 
in Turkey, in order to preserve the anonymity of my interviewees, I have used pseudo-
nyms and have not specified their titles or the positions they hold in their organisations. 
I mention only the television station they work for.
Infrastructural dimension
Along with 11 channels most of which were Kurdish channels, TV10 was closed down 
under the state of emergency in September 2016 which also meant that all its equip-
ment and infrastructure were confiscated to be sold to third parties. An appeal by TV10 
to resume broadcasting was rejected by the state of emergency commission under the 
state of emergency which was still in effect as of October 2017.2 However, TV10 still 
operates online, albeit with limited resources and a reduced programme schedule 
which has resulted in a loss of a wide section of its audience who do not have Internet 
access. Yol TV’s blackout also took place in late 2016 under the state of emergency; 
however, the way it was silenced was different, but like TV10 it is also available online 
as well as through Internet Protocol Television (IPTV), which similarly has also 
resulted in a loss of audience.
It is important to understand that communicative ethnocide is not necessarily totalitar-
ian in the sense that it is possible for it to recognise and respond differently to the differ-
ences, even nuances, contained within ethnic identities. The Turkish state’s varied 
approach to different Alevi television stations can be seen to be a result of this nuanced 
approach. Since the first Alevi TV station, TV Avrupa, started broadcasting, Alevi televi-
sion has explored a variety of ways of representing Alevism and the Alevi identity from 
broadcasting video clips of Alevi music to producing programmes on Alevi religion. 
Until recently, the different Alevi TV channels could be clearly differentiated in terms of 
their loyalty with regard to the differing political orientations to be found within the 
Alevi movement and the effect that these loyalties had on programming content in rela-
tion to Alevism itself. Thus, as well as reflecting different political orientations within 
the Alevi community, Cem TV, TV10 and Yol TV also adopted different definitions of 
Alevism. Within this variety of representations of Alevism, the state has a particular 
‘preferred Alevism’ which clearly defines it as being a sect within Islam, and it is this 
definition of Alevism which is exemplified by the broadcast content of Cem TV. For 
many of my interviewees, the Cem Foundation and Cem TV is a state project which 
works to assimilate Alevis into the Turkish-Islam synthesis.3 This accounts for the fact 
that while TV10 and Yol TV, which do not promulgate this ‘preferred’ definition, have 
been subject to different forms of communicative ethnocide, Cem TV has remained 
untouched and is still on air. As Clastres (2010) and Yalcinkaya (2014) argue, ethnocide 
does not aim to annihilate ethnic identity, as is the case with genocide, but aims to make 
the Other resemble the Same and the more similar to the Same (in this case, Turkish-
Sunni-Muslim), the better. This is the role that Cem TV assumes in its representation of 
Alevism, one that approximates Aleviness (Other) to Islam and Turkishness (Same). In 
many ways, it is similar to the Kurdish TV station TRT Kurdi, which was established by 
the Turkish state to fulfil the requirements of the European Union (EU), which can be 
thought as serving the same mission and representing the ‘preferred Kurdishness’.4
The fact that different Alevi channels with different political orientations have been 
subjected to different measures is itself indicative of the complexity in understanding 
how communicative ethnocide works and how it needs to be distinguished from more 
crude forms of censorship. While both are violations by the state, communicative ethno-
cide works by targeting a community and obstructing its communicative means in order 
to destroy the community’s cultural formation. Hence, I argue that the closure of TV10 
and Yol TV cannot simply be seen as attacks on the freedom of speech but are deeply 
rooted within the state’s ethnocidal policy against Alevis and must be regarded as a spe-
cific part of Alevi ethnocide.
Audience dimension
While it is more common to interfere in the content, production and regulation of ethnic 
television through the means of censorship and control, communicative ethnocide can 
also encompass the audience. In the case of Kurdish TV, the viewership itself can be 
regarded as an ethnic manifestation and communicative ethnocide has set its sights on 
viewership practices. The satellite dishes on top of the roofs of Kurdish residents were 
distinguishable with the change of satellites from Eutelsat to Intelsat and because of this 
the Turkish authorities were able to detect who was watching Med TV since the dishes 
acted as flags of identity. This resulted in
the smashing of satellite dishes, the intimidation of viewers, dish vendors, dish installers, and 
coffee-houses; a more effective form of repression is cutting off electricity from villages and 
small towns during prime time hours when MED-TV is on the air. (Hassanpour, 1998: 61)
This has not happened to the viewers of Alevi television as it is not possible to detect 
who they are by simple surveillance techniques as was the case of the Kurds. On the 
other hand, the closing of TV channels and limiting them to online communication has 
necessarily had an effect on the audience and the interviews conducted with those who 
work for Alevi television suggest that the closure of the channels has been a challenge, 
especially for those Alevis who live in remote and rural areas. The interviewees empha-
sised the significance of Alevi television for Alevis who live in villages:
For instance, before Yol TV we hadn’t been in contact with many communities [living in 
different regions]. With Yol TV we saw that there are Alevis living in different regions which 
we never thought of before. The Alevis [living in those regions] found an opportunity to express 
their feelings of fear, nervousness, hiding, all those human feelings. They felt ‘look, we have a 
television, we can talk and express ourselves’. A common value has been created [thanks to Yol 
TV]. In this sense, establishing television stations enabled us and Alevi organisations to reach 
the remote localities that we’ve never been able to before. This is very valuable, very meaningful. 
(Haydar, Yol TV)
Our live broadcast vehicle enters a village. One of the women starts shouting and ululating ‘I 
said they will definitely come here!’[in Kurdish] This is a need… One of the characteristics 
which distinguishes TV10 from other channels is that it is not concerned with popularity. Many 
people can appear on the screen and give good talks. But TV10 with great respect put a mic in 
front of Alevis who live in villages where nobody visited and cared to ask about their opinion 
or thought who cares if they talk … (Seyit, TV10)
Alevis living in rural areas find it much more difficult to represent themselves and to 
get their voices heard in local media and local politics. In this sense, Alevi television 
holds a symbolic significance for Alevis who live in remote places, particularly where 
there is a Sunni Muslim majority. On the other hand, one can argue that the closure of 
oppositional television stations in the aftermath of the attempted coup has pushed urban 
Alevis to rely more on Alevi television in order to receive information other than that 
provided by the government-supported media organisations. During my informal discus-
sions with Alevis living in Ankara and Istanbul, especially those who do not or cannot 
use social media, they argued that they find it difficult to access reliable news sources 
after the closure of oppositional television channels including Alevi television. In this 
way, communicative ethnocide is more destructive during periods of authoritarianism 
and increasing censorship where communities require more information about the politi-
cal agenda in order to protect and defend themselves.
Transnational dimension
The presence of Med TV and the studios, offices and production facilities of its successor 
stations in different European countries such as the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany, 
Sweden and Russia reinforced the identity of Euro-Kurdishness which as Soguk (2008: 
185) notes is cultivated through such a sense of aterritoriality and borderlessness. Despite 
its Euro-Kurdish identity, Kurdish broadcasting from Europe has been subjected to a
transnational form of communicative ethnocide where various countries have been
involved in the Turkish state’s attempt to silence Kurdish television. In Sinclair and
Smets’ (2014) words, ‘[n]ever before in the history of European television broadcasting
has there been a case in which the EU countries have aggressively fought to fine, censure
and close down television channels broadcasting from within the EU’ (p. 320). This
aggression by these EU countries has been stoked by international initiatives arising
from the Turkish state. As Hassanpour (1998) comments, ‘[a]mong the Middle Eastern
countries, Turkey is the first and the only one to use its full state power to silence
MED-TV’, and in order to implement its communicative ethnocide the state has used
different methods (p. 53). Within Turkey, it has ‘unleashed its coercive forces to prevent
the reception of the airwaves within Turkey, whereas in Europe, it used diplomatic
power, espionage, jamming, and various forms of intimidation to stop the emission of
television signals’ (Hassanpour, 1998: 53).
Even though the Turkish state has attempted to intervene in Alevi politics in European 
countries with, for example, its attempt to change the curriculum for Alevi lessons taught 
in Germany (as communicated in an interview with a member of the Federation of 
Germany Alevi Unions), there has been no direct interference by the Turkish state in the 
broadcasting by Alevi television channels in Europe, unlike the situation with Kurdish 
television. However, the threat of possible action in the future and the measures taken 
against Alevi television in Turkey means that communicative ethnocide proves a risk to 
the transnational connectivity of Alevi community and thereby a transnational issue. Ali 
from Yol TV explains the extent to which Yol TV serves as a means of transnational con-
nectivity for Alevis living in different countries:
Because this television does not belong to individuals, firstly the German Federation of Alevi 
Unions then other European countries [the members of the Alevi Unions living in European 
countries] had to watch it. In such a position it means say you live in Cologne then you are able 
to watch what Alevis in Sweden do. You could watch what Alevis in Denmark do. Before that 
Alevis had to meet together once a year or every six months and they would explain the situation 
in the UK, Sweden, Denmark and so on. But thanks to this system which has started a year ago, 
those in the UK were able to follow activities in Duisburg. (Ali, Yol TV)
This is not only the case with Yol TV which is run by the European Confederation 
of Alevi Unions. As well as having a studio in Germany, TV10 also serves as a medium 
for the transnational connectivity of the Alevi community in Turkey and Europe. Both 
channels have specific programmes which are produced in and about different locali-
ties in Turkey and Europe giving voice to the Alevi communities living in these vari-
ous local contexts. As most of the channels have been based in Europe and have 
appealed to Alevis in Turkey as well as Europe, Alevi television has made a signifi-
cant contribution towards the transnational experience of Alevis. As my interviews 
with television workers in Germany and Alevi audiences in Europe suggest, Alevi 
television has reflected and re-constructed the transnational Alevi public sphere as 
they have culturally bonded Alevis living in different countries and localities, have 
helped Alevi organisations to expand transnationally, and have enabled the Alevi 
community to gain confidence in being more explicit about their identity. Hence, the 
closure of Alevi channels and the consequent reduction in its audience has had signifi-
cant transnational consequences for the community. It interrupts the circulation of 
information in different localities and hinders European Alevis’ involvement with 
Turkish politics and the interconnectedness of Alevis in Turkey and in Europe. In this 
regard, it is not the communicative ethnocide of only those Alevis in Turkey but also 
the transnational Alevi community which is connected on a day-to-day basis through 
satellite television.
Both Kurdish and Alevi television broadcasting in the Turkish context demonstrates 
communicative ethnocide does not necessarily have only a national dimension despite 
the fact that it is implemented by the nation state. Instead, in the era of satellite and digi-
tal technologies, communicative ethnocide can and does take place in a transnational 
context where various national and international actors are involved as has been the case 
with Med TV and its successor television stations.
Resistance dimension
Communicative ethnocide is not a one-way stream so to speak. Communities which are 
targeted by it can also resist ethnocide through different methods and means. These 
include the use of different media like broadcasting online, finding more creative ways 
of engaging in media activism such as encouraging citizen journalism, and transferring 
their human resources to different media organisations or using them for different media 
productions. The experience of Kurdish and Alevi television epitomises the resistance 
against communicative ethnocide. Both TV10 and Yol TV do not regard their closure as 
an end but are looking for alternative ways to continue broadcasting, as well as seeking 
out temporary solutions in order to survive conditions under the Turkish state of emer-
gency. Hasan from TV10 explains how they are planning new documentary projects, 
some with the help and sponsorship of the community, despite the fact that their equip-
ment has been confiscated:
We signed contracts with some of our friends [previous workers] after the closure of TV10. We 
are trying to produce some programmes that we’ve been unable to do when TV10 was on air. 
As a preparation, as a transition to a new television, there is a crew of five to six people in 
Turkey. They are working on documentaries on Alevi ocaks, significant Alevi women in history 
such as Ana Fatma and Elif Ana. They co-produce and work as separate groups simultaneously. 
We’ve been unable to do these while on air, even if we wanted to because responding to the 
daily agenda and daily routine of the channel did not allow us. (Hasan, TV10)
In this case, the production of documentaries also operate as a mean of resistance 
which can help the previous workers of the channel remain engaged and used for 
researching and producing more about Alevi culture. This also operates as a means of 
existing during the period of political chaos as the future of media freedom in Turkey 
does not seem very promising and TV10’s future in particular continues to be uncertain 
due to legal complications arising from the decree laws passed as part of the state of 
emergency. The fact that TV10 has been based both in Germany and Turkey has, 
according to Hasan, also helped a great deal in ensuring the survival of the channel. 
Even though they have no access to the technical infrastructure in Turkey, they have 
been able to broadcast online thanks to their equipment in Germany and, in this regard, 
transnationalism has helped Alevi television to survive and has worked against the 
attempts of communicative ethnocide. In this, they have been more fortunate than their 
Kurdish counterparts. Currently, there have also been demonstrations taking place in 
Istanbul every Saturday with the attendance of various Alevi organisations protesting 
at the closure of TV10.
Yol TV has also employed various strategies to retain its audience during the black-
out. It broadcasts online and tries to encourage its viewers to move to the IPTV system 
where viewers can watch Yol TV on their television through the use of a special device 
fitted to it. Yol TV benefits from events organised by the European Confederation of 
Alevi Unions which are used to inform the community about this new system and at 
which the IPTV boxes are available for sale. My interviews with, for example, Ali, 
Haydar and Turabi from Yol TV explain how the channel seeks a long-term solution to 
the disruption caused by the instabilities of Turkish politics and the pressures from the 
Turkish state. These include changing the satellite through which Yol TV is broadcast as 
well as using terrestrial broadcasting. Both of these solutions suggest a Europe-centred 
vision which anticipates the future of Yol TV in the European broadcasting market.
Conclusion
Communicative ethnocide does not take place in a vacuum, instead it should be seen as 
part of a broader project of ethnocide. Even though it has taken place within the specific 
conditions of the period after the attempted coup, during which the AKP government has 
aimed to re-establish its authority over different factions of the opposition, the closure of 
TV10 and Yol TV must be regarded as part of the pre-existing ethnocide policy of the 
Turkish state for whom satellite broadcasting is regarded as a further challenge to its 
broader national policies and its project of constructing the ‘ideal citizen’. At the same 
time, satellite broadcasting has proved an opportunity for migrant communities like 
Alevis to reaffirm existing identities while constructing an imagined transnational one 
within a transnational public sphere and to pursue their political ambitions. But satellite 
technology does not guarantee a realm which is free from state interventions as Kurdish 
and Alevi television exemplify, even though Alevi television, through the use of online 
broadcasting technology, managed to circumvent these interventions, although with a 
more limited size of audience.
The Alevi case demonstrates that the opportunities for resistance to communicative 
ethnocide are very much bounded by the community’s transnational capabilities, includ-
ing community organisations, the political mobilisation of its members and the commu-
nity’s infrastructural media investments. The attempt by Yol TV to promote IPTV 
technology among the members of the European Alevi community can be regarded as an 
example of this resistance. The need to promote new types of digital communication 
technology for Alevis in Turkey as well as audiences abroad presents a challenge for 
Alevi broadcasting that wishes to resist communicative ethnocide. While technological 
advances do not necessarily guarantee the creation of a freer transnational public sphere 
for communities such as Alevis they can provide short term, and possibly even longer 
term, opportunities for survival in the face of a communicative ethnocide directed by the 
state. But the future of transnational Alevi broadcasting and the fight against communi-
cative ethnocide is uncertain and may well take different directions in Turkey and Europe.
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Notes
1. Within the Alevi community, there is an ongoing debate about whether Alevism is or is not
part of Islam. In line with the views of the Alevi Unions, my interviewees from Yol TV regard 
Alevism as a religion in its own right and have coined the term ‘a religion of nature’ with
reference to its respect for nature. My interviewees from TV10, on the other hand, tend to
embrace many different interpretations of Alevism including those which consider it as a sect
of Islam or is in some sense a ‘truer’ form of Islam.
2. TV10 has received an official document indicating that it was closed as a result of the decree.
However, the appeal submitted to the State of Emergency Commission was rejected on the
grounds that the channel was closed down not by the decree but by the decision of a commis-
sion working for the Prime Ministry.
3. The Turkish-Islam synthesis can be regarded as the founding principle of the Turkish
Republic where the ideal citizenship is described around the composition of Turkishness and
Muslimness. However, the term Turkish-Islam synthesis became an ideological programme
in the 1980s and was reinforced by the state (Guvenc et al., 1991).
4. Smets (2016: 742) mentions that TRT 6’s editors are journalists who were recruited among
the Gulenists before the coup and at a time when the Gulenists were supported by the govern-
ment. This also indicates the state’s approach to the communicative ethnocide of the Kurds
which is one of Islamising them through the means of a religious organisation, in other words, 
reassembling the Other (Kurdish) as the Same (Turkish) through the use of the common
ground of religion (Islam). It is no coincidence that TRT 6 has been more attractive to those
Kurds who are more religious and for whom their Muslim identity matters (Arsan, 2014).
Akcam T (2013) The Young Turks’ Crime against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic 
Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire. Princeton, NJ; Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Algan E (2003) Privatization of radio and media hegemony in Turkey. In: Artz L and Kamalipour 
YE (eds) The Globalization of Corporate Media Hegemony. Albany, NY: State University of 
New York Press, pp. 169–194.
Appadurai A (2006) Fear of Small Numbers. Durham, NC; London: Duke University Press.
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[The perception of TRT Ses in Kurds in Turkey: a research on mother tongue broadcasting]. 
Istanbul: Bilgi University.
Barabas A and Bartholeme M (1973) Hydraulic Development and Ethnocide: The Mazatec and 
Chinantec People of Oaxaca, Mexico. Copenhagen: International Work Group for Indigenous 
Affairs (IWGIA).
Borovali M and Boyraz C (2015) The Alevi workshops: an opening without an outcome? Turkish 
Studies 16(2): 145.
Casula P (2015) Between ‘ethnocide’ and ‘genocide’: violence and otherness in the coverage of 
the Afghanistan and Chechnya wars. Nationalities Papers 43(5): 700–718.
Clarke G (2001) From ethnocide to ethnodevelopment? Ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples 
in Southeast Asia. Third World Quarterly 22(3): 413–436.
Clastres P (2010) Archeology of Violence. Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e).
Clavero B (2008) Genocide or Ethnocide, 1933–2007: How to Make, Unmake, and Remake Law 
with Words. Milano: Giuffre Editore.
Ecevitoglu P and Yalcinkaya A (2013) Aleviler ‘Artik Burada’ Oturmuyor! [Alevis do not live 
‘here anymore!’]. Ankara: Dipnot.
Emre Cetin KB (2018). Television and the making of a transnational Alevi identity. National 
Identities 20(1): 91–103.
Escobar T (1989) Ethnocide: Mission Accomplished? Copenhagen: International Work Group for 
Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA).
Guvenc B, Saylan G and Tekeli I (1991) Turk-Islam Sentezi Dosyasi. Istanbul: Sarmal.
Emre Cetin 1023
Hassanpour A (1998) Satellite footprints as national borders: med-tv and the extraterritoriality of 
state sovereignty. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 18(1): 53–72.
Hassanpour A (2003) Diaspora, homeland and communication technologies. In: Karim HK (ed.) 
The Media of Diaspora. London: Routledge, pp. 76–88.
Kaya R and Cakmur B (2010) Politics and the mass media in Turkey. Turkish Studies 11(4): 
521–537.
Lemarchand R (1994) Burundi: Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press and Woodrow Wilson Center.
Lizot J (1976) The Yanomami in the Face of Ethnocide. Copenhagen: International Work Group 
for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA).
Lord C (2017) Rethinking the justice and development party’s ‘Alevi openings’. Turkish Studies 
18(2): 278–296.
Massicard E (2010) Alevi communities in Western Europe: identity and religious strategies. In: 
Nielsen JS (ed.) Yearbook of Muslims in Europe. London: Brill Publisher, pp. 561–592.
Matsaganis M, Katz V and Ball-Rokeach S (2011) Understanding Ethnic Media: Producers, 
Consumers, and Societies. Los Angeles, CA: Sage.
Sinclair C and Smets K (2014) Media freedoms and covert diplomacy: Turkey challenges Europe 
over Kurdish broadcasts. Global Media and Communication 10(3): 319–331.
Smets K (2016) Ethnic media, conflict, and the nation-state: Kurdish broadcasting in Turkey and 
Europe and mediated nationhood. Media, Culture and Society 38(5): 738–754.
Soguk N (2008) Transversal communication, Diaspora, and the Euro-Kurds. Review of 
International Studies 34(1): 173–192.
Sokefeld M (2008) Struggling for Recognition: The Alevi Movement in Germany and in 
Transnational Space. New York: Berghahn Books.
Venkateswar S (2004) Development and Ethnocide: Colonial Practices in the Andaman Islands. 
Copenhagen: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA).
White P and Jongerden J (2003) Turkey’s Alevi Enigma: A Comprehensive Overview. Leiden; 
Boston, MA: Brill Publisher.
Williams R (2002) Culture is ordinary. In: Highmore B (ed.) The Everyday Life Reader. London: 
Routledge, pp. 91–100.
Yalcinkaya A (2014) Kavimkirim Ikliminde Aleviler [Alevis in the climate of ethnocide]. Ankara: 
Dipnot.
